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ABSTRACT 
This paper  focuses o11  tlie  seasoiial  predictability  of  stocli ii~arkct  returns. 
\Ve  inbestigate tlie statistical sigiiificance of predicting stock returns fl-oin several 
calcndar duinmies. Our niaiii fiildings, usiiig iiioiltlily stoel< iiiarl<et returns fi-oin 
Belgium, Geniiaiiy, tlie Netherlaiids, UK aiid US, are that tlie Jaiiuary cffect dis- 
appears over tiine, but a stroiig support is found for tlie Sell-in-l\llay effect. This 
implies that ior each couiitry, tlie retiirils  are o11 average sigiiificaiiily  higher iii 
tlie winter tliai~  i11 tlie sumriier periods. Fiilally, we oiily find inodcrate suppoit 
for a dccciiiiial cycle. Years eiidiiig i11 five have historically bceii tlie best years 
to iiivest in US stock, but tliis cycle cffect is ilot fouiid i11  tlie otlier countrics. 
"Oiie of  tl?e etri./ies/ tnitJ 1770st  eii(iliriizg  qzlestioi7~  offii~c~t~citil  ecoi1oi)7efi.ic.r  is ii,l1efl7ei. 
,~~II~II~L.~LI/  ussef pi?ce.r  are forec~n.stnhle. Pei.17~7ps  beccizise  of  the ohi~ioli.~  iriiologii 
" The author acknowledges the support fi-oin IUAP(P4/01). Thc autilor appreciatcs tlie 
coiiiments OS  Guiiio De Bruy~le,  Hans De\vacllter, Ben Jacobseil, Tlieo Nijinaii, Fi-ans 
Spiililewyii, Maiïio Verbeek aiid ai1 ailonymous referee. For iilany years, it  was believed  (especially uiider  acadeniics) that 
stock prices follow raildoin walks, i.e. tlie best prediction of tlie iiext 
period's stock price is today's price plus a drift teiln. This would iiliply 
tliat stock retuilis are not predictable. Thei-e is growing evidence that 
stock market returns are predictable to soilie degree. Tlie literature 
documents predictability of stock iiidex retuilis froi-ii lagged returiis, 
lagged fiiiailcial  and ii?acroecoiiomic variables,  aiid caleridar  duin- 
ii~ies. 
Tlie guidiiig priiiciple tliat  asset iliarltets are efficient aiid stock 
prices can be described by a raiidom walk is simply stated, but its 
iiilplicatioiis  are inatiy aiid s~ibtle.  Tlie Eflìcient Mhr-ket Hypothesis 
(EMH)  11as  its roots in tlie pioileering worlt of Gibsoii (1889) who 
writes that "ivhen shnr*es becoi77e publicly  kiiowl? i17 nii opei? nzar.Iet, 
tlie  volzle i.vl7ic37  thej~  clcg~iire  nilcly  De  regor-ded as the jziclgenie17t 
of'the best  ilitellige?ice colicenzing them", Gibson ((1889) p.11). 
It should be stressed that the views regarding the EMH are iiot tlle 
results from doctrinaire beliefs, but result froin a large body of el~zpi- 
rical work.' The EMH inay be expressed iii a iiuliiber of alternative 
ways aild the differences betweeii these alternative represei~tations 
caii becoine ratlier entangled. Tlie geiieral idea behind tlie EMH is 
tliat asset prices are deterii~iiied  by tlie supply aiid deinand iii a coiii- 
petitive inarltet with rational investors. These rational iiivestors gat- 
her relevaiit information very rapidly and immediately incorporate 
this iiifsrination into stock priccs. If this inf~rinatioil  is imnlediately 
incorporated into prices, oiily  iiew iiiforination,  i.e. news, sliould 
cause change iii prices. Siiice news is unpredictable by defiiiition, 
price cliaiiges (returiis) sliould be uiipredictable.  Coiltrary to inost 
precediilg research, Malltiel (1992) offers an explicit definition of the 
EMH: 
"A capiftrl riznr-lcef is said to De  efficient ij'it  fi//iy and coi.i.ecfIy i.<flecf.s  al/ 
~,elevarit  i~7fOi-ninfioii  in deter-iqiiniiig security y~ices.  Fo~iiitrllj:  the riiní.ket is 
,rail! to De  efficiei?t ~ilif/i  resyecf fo s«i?le ii7fU1-ninfioti  sef if'.rec~ii-i/])  pr-iccs 
ii:ould  he  unqfficred  Dj)  isilenliiig  that  infoi.r71afioii /o u// par.ticii,crill,r. 
Moreovei;  efiìcieriq~  ii,ith respect to ai? ir~joi-mati017  set in1plie.s fhaf if is 
ii?ipo.s.~ible  to 117c1ke  econoriiic pr0fit.r  Dy  t~.ading  071 flze 11nsi,s qf'that ir~for- 
nlatioti set. " 
To test tlie efficient inarltet hypothesis, it is necessary to specify a 
iliodel of "nonnal"  expected rehitlis. The classic assuinptioil used lo be tliat expected  stock retuills  are constant over time, but  these lias 
beeii  aii  increasiiigly  ainount of literature  tliat  provides  evideilce 
agai~ist  this ass~mption.  In pal-ticuias, ctivideiid yields aild iiiterest i-ates 
seeiii to liave soine significant predictive power. This plieiloinenoii 
occurs over busiiiess cycle and longes horizons. Technica1 systeiiis for 
predicting daily aiid weeltly stock returns are still close to useless after 
trailsactioi~  costs (see, e.g., Hawanini aild Keiiii (1995)). Wliile most 
Ililancial ecoiloiiiists seein to liave accepted these views, they do ilot 
agree about the degree of the predictability. 
Evideiice of ret~ìril  predictability  does ilot ilecessarily ineaii tliat 
markets are iiot (reasoiiably) efficieiit. Because of tiine-varyiilg expec- 
ted returns d~ie  to changing business conditioiis aild rislts, retui-iis ca11 
be partly predictable, eveii when tlie EMH Iiolds. Coilseq~iently,  tes- 
ting for efficieiit iiiarkets critically depeiids on tlie assumed model for 
the returns. 
Tllis paper preseilts an overview of tlie iiiost iiliportant aild latest 
eiilpirical evideilce iii the predictability literature. Many receiit studies 
report that tlie expected returns iii stock inarkets are time varying and 
inarltets cal1 be beaten by usiiig caleiidar dummies or lagged fiilaiicial 
aiid macroecoiioinic variables. The ernpirical part of this paper deals 
witli tlie question whether stock ret~~rns  are predictable from the fol- 
lowiiig three seasonal pattems: the January effect, the Sell-in-May 
effect aiid the Years-endiiig-in-five effect. These anoinalies would 
imply that tlie  returns are on average higher iil Jailuary, betweei1 
November aiid April, and iii years endiiig in five, respectively. This 
study aiins to investigate these seasoi~alitiss  in stock index returns of 
tlie  stoclt inarkets of Belgiuin, Gerinaily, the Netlierlaiids,  UI<  aiid 
US, over tlie period Januaiy 1973 -  May 2002. This allows US to exa- 
mine wlietlier tlie seasonal pattei~ls  usually fouild iil US data is also 
present iil Europeail data. 1ii this paper we concentrate oii lower fre- 
quency (iiioiithly, yearly) seasonal patteins, as profitable exploitatioii 
of higli-frequency  seasoilal pattesiis is reported  to  disappear when 
transactioii costs are talteii iiito accouilt (see Laltoiiisl~olt  aild Smidt 
(1988)). 
The reiliaiiider of the paper is orgailized as follows. In Section TI 
we present a review of the evideiice on stoclt returii predictability. 
Section 111 presents tlie statistical evideilce of the Jail~iary,  Sell-iii-May 
aiid Years-eiiding-in-five  effects iii Belgium, Gerinaiiy, tlie Netlier- 
lands, UK and US. Section 1V concludes and coiitains  soiiie fiilal 
reinarlts. 11. REVIEW OF THE RETURN PREDICTABILITY LITERATURE 
The literahlre o11 time-series returii predictability'  can be divided iiito 
three "braiiclies":  return predictability usiiig lagged prices 01- returns, 
lagged finaiicial and iiiacroeconomic variables, and calendar diimmies. 
Tlie first bi-aiicli of studies tries to predict stock returns using liistori- 
cal prices or retui~is.  Tlie ceiitral questioii 111 tliis braiicli of iiivestiga- 
tioiis is whether today's rehirn is i-elated to historieal rekiins, at various 
freque~icies.  For example, Fama aiid French (1988) and Poterba and 
Suiniiiers (1988) study loiig horizoii return predictability  and find 
some evideiice of iiiean reversion iii rehirils over long-liorizoiis (iliore 
thaii two years). Iii general, stock-index returns, os more geiierally 
retuilis of portfolios, tend to be positively (first-order) autocoi-related 
for most frequeiicies for inost co~iiltries.~  A possible explanatioii for 
tliis  effect oii daily or weeltly  data is noiisynchroiioiis tradiiig (see, 
e.g., Lo aiid MacKinlay (1990a,b) aiid Caiiipbell, Lo aiid MacKinlay 
(19971, Chapter 2). In iiiaiiy cases this relationship is not statistically 
sigiiificant. Eveii if tliere  is a significaiit relatioiiship, it is typically 
too wealt to obtain a higher return thaii tlie b~iy-and-liold  strategy of 
tlie inarket portfolio after correction for risk and traiisactioii  costs. 
In otlier words, there is 110  econoriiic sig17$cnnce. 
Aiiother example of the first braiich of st~idies  iiicludes technical 
aiialysis. Techilical analysis, also lulown as "charting",  tries to fore- 
cast iiihire retunis froin past prices. A inajority of the fiiiancial eco- 
nomist~  used to be, and still is, veiy slteptical about this approach aiid 
its capability to generate abnoimal returns. One of the ~nain  objec- 
tioiis is tlie highly subjective nature of tecliiiical ailalysis. A recent 
paper by Lo, Mainayslty arid Waiig (2000), however, suggests that to 
soilie extent technical analysis caii be usefiil out-of-sainple and is able 
to geiierate abnoriiial  returiis even after correctiiig for transaction 
costs. Several popular techiiical indicators outperforin passive strate- 
gies, usiiig US stock inarket data froin 1962 to  1996. 
The secoiid branch of studies exainiiies tlie predictability usiiig lag- 
ged econoinic aiid fiiiaiicial variables such as dividend yield aria inte- 
rest rates. Notable  exainples  are the papers by  Fama  aiid  French 
(1988), Breeil, Glosteii aiid Jagaiiiiathaii (1989), Harvey (l  99 l), Solilil< 
(1993) and Pesaraii and Tiininermaiiii ((1995), (2000)). For exainple, 
Pesaraii aiid Tiininermanii (1995), usiiig nionthly US data froin  1960 
uiitil  1992 and iiitroduciiig inodel uncertaiiity, fouiid statistically and 
econoniically  significant  retuni  predictability  usiiig  a  variety  of (lagged) explaiiatoiy variables. Ainoiig tliese  are tlie dividend yield. 
the price-eariiings ratio, the sliort interest rate, the loiig terin bond 
retuili, the change in iiid~istrial  productioii, and tlie twelve-inoiith iiifla- 
tion rate. Soliiili (1993): oii the other liaiid, conipares tlie predictabi- 
lity for Gei~iiaiiy,  Fraiice, tlie Netherlaiids, U.K., Switzerlaiid, Japaii, 
Canada aiid US, usiiig the lagged dividend yield, a sliort telm interest 
rate, a loiig tem  bond returi~.~  Usiiig moiithly data froin 1970 to 1990 
he fiiids that especially the lagged divideiid yield lias a large predic- 
tive power for most countries. 
Finally, the third braiicli of st~idies  coi~centrates  on tlie predictability 
by usiiig seasonal (or calendar) d~iiniiiies.  If the sinlple iiotioii of the 
efficient inarliet liypothesis holds (i.e. prices follow a raiidoiii walk), 
the expected retui~i  on a certaiil stock should be the saine regardless of 
what day or inoiith it is. Stated differently, the iiifoi~nation  of what day 
or moiith it is sliould have iio predictive value for the price for tlie 
stock after this period. Evidence shows that this condition is not always 
tnie; tlierefore these seasonals are soinetiines called anoinalies. 
A well-ltnowii5 calendar effect is the Jontlarj1 ejrect: iiidex returns 
are on average higher  iii January thaii in other inonths (see, e.g., 
Rozeff aiid Kinney (1976) aiid Keiin (1989)).6 Hawanini and Keiin 
(1995) show that the order of inagnitude of this effect depends on the 
country and on the composition of the iiidex. Because the January 
effect is especially present for smal1 films, the Jaiiuary effect is espe- 
cially proiiounced in equally weighted iiiarliet indices. Nevertheless, 
the effect is usually also present in value-weighted indices. The inost 
popular  explanatioii for the cxisteiice of this effect is tlie  tax-loss 
selliiig hypothesis (see,  e.g. Bhabra, Dliilloii and Raiiiirez  (1996)). 
This hypothesis states that there is a heavy selling pressure at tlie eiid 
of tlie tax year, since iii some countries tlie sale of securities that liave 
experienced price decliiies, i.e. capita1 losses, can be offset agaiiist 
taxable income. Sinall stoclis are more likely to be used for tliis as they 
are risliier in general, so thai: tliey have a higher probability of large 
price decliiies. In the begiiiiiing of the iiew tax year investors typi- 
cally reiiivest iii these (or siniilar) stocks, leadiiig to a relative high 
ret~irii  in Jaiiuaiy. An alteriiative explaiiation is "wiiidow  dressing": 
iiivestnieiit managers might sell "loser" securities at the eiid of tlie year 
to preseiit a nice portfolio at the begiiining of the year (see Haugen 
and Lalioiiishok  (1988)). 
Another seasoiial effect iiicludes tlie dqv-ojLthe-week eflect, wliich 
refers to the fiildiiig tliat Monday is a relatively bad day, n~liile  Friday is a relatively good day for stock prices (see, e.g., Frencli (1980), Keiin 
aild  Stainbaugli  (19841, aild Hawaniili  aiid Keiin  (1995)). Chang, 
Pinegar aild Ravicliandran (1  998) show that the day-of-the-week effect 
wealteils  s~ibstantially  wlieii responses to inacroecoiloinic iiews are 
taken int0 account. Tlie response of smaller stoclts to this kind of iiews 
is typically high oii Moiidays, especially iil down markets. Siiiiilar to 
the day-of-the-week effect, literature shows that there is a fuun-qfLfhe- 
1xont11 effect. For exainple, Ariel (1987) aild Cadsby aiid Ratiier (1992) 
show that returils are on average higher on the last day of tlie month 
aiid the first day of the next inonth.'  The well-docuineilted holiday 
elfect (see, e.g.,  Laltoiiishok aiid Smidt (1988) and Ariel (1990)) iinp- 
lies that prices rise o11  average more oii the day(s) proceeding holidays. 
This effect is not only preseilt iil US stock markets, but holds more 
uiiiversally. Cadsby aiid Ratiler (1  992) and Kim and Park (1  994) show 
that  the  holiday  effect  is  present  in  interiiational  stock markets. 
Typically, the holiday effect is only present for the local holiday. Due 
to traiisaction costs it is, in general, not profitable to trade oii the basis 
of these aiioinalies. 
A recent study uncovers that a strategy based on another seasoiial 
effect, namely the Sell-in-May effect, reinains surprisingly profitable 
for many countries in case of reasonable transaction costs (Bounian 
and Jacobsen (1999)). This stsategy, which is based 011  the old (English) 
stock inarket wisdom "Sell  in  May and go away,  btrt remember to 
come back in Septei~~ber",  advises iilvestors to sell their stocks iii May 
and  buy  again  in  Septeinber.  A  closely  related  strategy  is  the 
Halloween indicator, so iiamed (in tlie US) because it would have you 
in the stock inarltet from October 3 1 to April 30 and out of the inar- 
ket for the otlier half of the year (see O'Higgiiis and Downes (1992)). 
The Belgian version of the wisdom tells us to sell arouild Bnissels 
Fair (early June) aild buy arouild Leuven Fair (Septeinber). Boumaii 
and Jacobsen (1999) siiggest that this aiiomaly is related to the dura- 
tioii of suinmer holiday iil the partictilar country. Tlie longer the holi- 
day,  the larger the difference between the returns in winter (from 
November ~ailtil  April) aiid suiiimer (froin May until October) inontlis. 
Aiiother strong, b~lt  i1ot so wel1 lulown seasoiial pattem is the Enrs- 
ending-ir~,fìve efict.  This deceililial  cycle, originally identified by 
Edgar Lawrence Smith in his boolt "Coininon  Stocks and Busiiiess 
Cycles",  was docunieilted iil 1924. Siiiith found that years ending iil 
7 have the worst returns, while years ending in five have by far the 
best ret~iriis  on average. Siilce the  1880s, the US stock inarket has never had a down year in aiiy year ending iii Iive. Slie decennial cycle 
holds LIP wel1 altliough Sinitli could liever explain it. Of course, deceii- 
iiial cycles inay be purely raiidon? eveiits. 
For al1 of tlie tliree braiiches above, we sliould be aware of tlie dati- 
gei- of data ~~1oopi11g.  If you try a great nuinber of different variables 
to predict stoclt rehiilis, you \vil1 eventually Iind soiiie variables that 
have statistically sigiiificaiit predictive power, so appareiitly there is a 
geii~iiiie  relationsliip. Tlius, because so inany variables have been tried, 
it is iiot surprisiiig that one eveiihrally fiiids variables with forecasting 
power."lie  daiiger is that it worlts wel1 within tlie sainple, but wil1 
liave 110  predictive power out-of-sainple. Because rnaiiy researchers 
use the came data sets (particularly for tlie US) this data-snooping pro- 
blem cal-ries over to other studies. To circumvent tliis problein we caii 
study data sets of other couiiti-ies9  aiid more receiit sainples. Lo aiid 
MacICiiilay (1990b) study this problem technically by speci@iiig a-pri- 
ori data-snooping strategies. They coiiclude that iii general the amouiit 
of forecastability fouiid einpirically (for various strategies) is larger 
tliaii wliat caii be explaiiled by data snoopiiig only. For techilical tra- 
ding  rules  (used by,  e.g., technica1 aiialysts),  however,  Sullivan, 
Tiininerinaiin aíid White (1999) fiiid tliat there is iio evideilce of out- 
performance  anyinore  oiice  data-snoopiiig  effects  are  talteii  into 
account. A phenomenoii wliich is possibly related to the data siioopiiig 
is the einpirical findiiig by Diiiisoil aiid Marsh (1999), tliat inany aiio- 
malies disappeaí- os reverse itself aîíer íhey are published, which they 
refer to as (an application of) Murpliy's law. Next sectio11 exaiiiiiies the 
predictable seasonal pattenis in nioiitlily returns. We examine whether 
the January effect, Sell-iii-May effect aiid Years-ei~diiig-in-IIve  effect 
is present iii Belgium, Geiliiaiiy, the Netherlands, UK aiid US. 
111.  SEASONALITY N STOCIC MARKET RETURNS 
To  exaiiiine the January effect, Sell-in-May effect aiid Years-ending- 
in-íïve effect, we use data oii the inontlily stock returns of the follo- 
wing value-weighted inarltet indices: BEL 20 (Belgiuin), DAX  100 
(Geriiiaiiy), AEX (tlie Netherlands), FTSE  100 (UK), and S&P 500 
(US). All series are Datastream re-investiiieiit iiidi~es'~  (expressed iii 
local curreiicies) over Januaiy 1973 -  May 2002, except the S&P 500 
index, which starts in Jaiiuary 1965. Iii Table 1 we report sorne suin- 
inary statistics of the indices over the entire period aild tlie aiioinaly pel-iod corresponding to L'he  jaiiuaiy effect, the Seii-in-May effect aiid 
the Uears-endiiig-in-flve effect. To exainiile the Sell-in-May effect, we 
follow Bouniaii and Jacobseii (1  999) and divide tlie saiiiple iiito "wiii- 
ter" (Noveiiibei- through April) and "suininer"  (May througli October) 
periods. The results in Table  1 show tliat for each couiitry tlie retiims 
are i-elatively high oii Jaiiuary, in winter periods aiid iii years eiiding 
in Ilve. Higher returiis during tlie outperfoi~iiiiig  period could just be 
a coiiipesisatioii for higlier risk in these periods. As caii be seen froiii 
Table  1, risk, measured by the staiidard deviatioii, teiids to be siinilar 
i11  al1 periods. Tliis  suggests that the seasonal effects are tiot just  a 
coiiipeiisatioii  for liigher risk. Figures l -  3 display graphical illust- 
rations of the average iiioiitlily return in tlie anomaly period aiid the 
average return  duriiig  the otlier moiiths. The  inoiitlily returiis  are 
siinple perceiitages. 
First we exainine the well-luiown  aiiomaly tliat stocl<s have liisto- 
rically generated abnonnally high retxins duriiig the inontli of Jaiiuary. 
TABEL 1 
SLTiVMARY RESULTS 
Al1 Months  January  Winter  Years in 5 
Belgiuii~ 
M eail (%)  0.881  2.439  1.656  1.787 
Std. Dev. (%)  5.148  6.096  5.293  5.080 
Germany 
Mean (Yb)  0.809  1.354  1.493  2.848 
Std. Dev. (%)  5.475  4.633  4.850  5.685 
Netlierlaiids 
Mean (Yo)  1.087  2.884  1.942  2.199 
Std. Dev. (%)  5.028  5.947  4.846  4.933 
UK 
Mean (%)  0 951  2 348  1  723  1 395 
Std  Dev  (%)  4 764  4 743  4 225  3 079 
US 
Meai1  0.665  1.713  1.121  1.923 
Std  Dev. (%)  4.366  5.152  4.155  3.382 Table 1 aild Figure i indicate that tilere is an overwheliliing Jaiiuary 
effect for al1 five couiltries. The Jaiiuaiy effect seeilis largest for tlie 
Belgiunl, the Netherlands  aild the UK. A natura1 question to ask is 
whetlier tliis aiioinaly is statistically significailt. To exailiine whether 
strategies based  011  this January effect have sigiiificaiit forecasting 
power, we use the following eq~~atioi-i:"  " 
K,_, = u. t  ~~Jaii,_~  t  t,,,,  (1 
wllere Jail, is a dummy for tlie inoilth Jaiiuary: 1 for observatioiis rela- 
tiiig to the iiiontl~  Jailuary,  aild  O  for observatioiis  Croiil  the  otlier 
rnonths. We test whetlier the coefficient of Jail,_, is sigiiificantly dif- 
ferent fì-oiil zero. Wlieii a,  is positive and significant, we reject tlie ilull 
hypothesis of no January effect. 111  that  case the mean returns  in 
January are on average sigiiificaiitly higher than otlier iiioiiths. When 
u,  in (l) is  zero, we obtain the random walk inodel. 111  Panel A 
of Table 2 we report soiiie basic estiii~atiori  results of eq~~atioil  (2). 
The table shows tliat the Jailuary effect is statistically  significant in 
two out of the five couiltries at tlie  five percent sigilificance level 
(a t-value greater than  1.96). The fact tliat we do not observe a Jailuary 
effect in the UK could be due to tlie fact that tlie UK does ilot use 
Deceiliber 3 1 as tlie tax year-end. Civen Figure 1 aild previous studies, 
it is quite a s~ii-prise  that we oiily fiild a significant effect in two out 
of thc five couiitries. As anomalizs couÍd disappear as many traciers 
FIGURE  1 
Ai,ei.uge re/iii.i7s i17  Jriiliioi?: ~717d  Fehr~~~~i:i~-Decei~~hei. aileinpt to iake acivaniage of ir  in advance, it is wei1 possibíe thar the 
January effect disappeared iil recent years. To investigate tliis q~lestioii, 
we look at a more  period, naiilely Jaiiuary  1990 through May 
2002 below. But first we corisider another strikiiig seasoiial effect; the 
olie based oii tlie old market wisdoiii: "Se11  in May aiid go away, but 
reineiliber to coine back iii September". 
Lool<iiig at Figure 2, we see that tlie average returiis  differ much 
betweeii sLiniiiier aiid winter periods. Retui-lis over the May-October 
period tend to be close to zero in al1 countries. For Belgiuni, Cerniaiiy 
and the Netherlailds, ïhe average return iil the suiniiier period is even 
iiegative. Lilte Bouinan aiid Jacobseii(1999), we also find that the dif- 
fereiice is smallest for the US. As iiidicated in Sectioii 11, this could 
be related to tlie relatively short period of suininer lioliday iii the US. 
To exaiiliiie if strategies based on the Sell-in-May effect have signifi- 
caiit forecastiiig power for inontlily  returiis, we use the followiiig 
model : 
R,+, = Po  +Pi st-i +  e,-,>  (2) 
where S, is the "Sell-in-May  indicator":  1 for observations froni the 
iiioiitlis November through April, aiid O for observations from the other 
FIGURE 2 
Ai:ei.age retl/i.n.s i11 i2li~,-Octol1ei.  ("Szi~~ir?ier'>  and Nove7izbei.-April ("FVi~intei~'~ TABEL L 
SEASOIZ!~  L  EFFECTS 
IZesiilts qfestiii~iifing  eqiiatioiis (1)-(3)  iisi17g t11e retlii.iis 017  the i,nlzle ii,eig/lted 
stock ii7iJicrs jbi. Bclgiiiii~.  Gel-inniy: fhe  iVethei.ln~rtr'.s,  UK  oiitl US. 
Tl~e  t-,~nli~es  hased ui? /7elei.o.si.ec/c1sticihfi  coi7sisteiit S~~IMLÍ'~IIZJ  ei.i.ui-; 
irie i.epoi'te~/  i11 i~aicnfheses;  " i17ci'icrrtr.s tlic~f  fl7e coi.ie.sl~o17iï'i17g  cu</jicieiif  is 
stirtisticcrl~~  tliffeie~it  ji.oi~  ze1.0 af  the Jive pel-ceiif sigiiifìcniice lellel. 
Explanatory 
Belgi~in~  Geimiaily  Netliei-luricf~  UI< 
Vnriablcs 
Panel A: Januaiy Effect 
Constant  0.005  0.006"  0.007"  0.008"  0.006" 
(1.781)  (2.1  54)  (2.415)  (2.843)  (2.627) 
Jcri~,  , ,  0.019"  0.007  0.0224:  0.015  0.0  11 
(1.966)  (0.660)  (2.234)  (1.503)  (1.554) 
R'  0.011  0.001  0.014  0.008  0.005 
Aclj. R"  0.008  -0.002  0.011  0.004  0.003 
Pailel B: Scll-iil-May Effcct 
Pancl C: Years-Endiilg-in-Five Effect 
Coilstarit  0.005  0.005  0.007*  0.009:''  0.005" 
(1.864)  (1.539)  (2.471)  (3.046)  (2.298) 
yjr  I ,  0.013  0.024"  0.015  0.005  0.014" 
(1.414)  (2.430)  (1.723)  (0.706)  (2.652) 
R?  0.006  0.018  0.008  0.00 1  0.010 
Arlj. R'  0.003  0.015  0.005  -0.003  0.008 
ilioi~ths.'~  We reject tlie ilull l~ypotliesis  of ilo Sell-in-May effect wliei~ 
p is positive aiid sigi~ificant. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that iil each couiltry there is a statistically 
significailt Sell-in-May effect preseiit at the five percent level (t-value 
larger tllail  1.96). Tl~e  effect is liighly statistically  significant as al1 t-values are considerably greater thail i .CJb."  The r-.value fo~iiiu  in the 
US data is somewliat higher thaii tlie coisespondiiig one iil Boumaii aiid 
Jacobsen (1  999). Usiiig data froiii Januaiy  1970 to August  1998 tliey 
fiiid a t-value of  1.95. A poscible reascm that tl-ie Sell-iii-May effect is 
wealcest iii tlie US  is possibly related to the leilgtli of suii~ruer  l~oli- 
dayc, which is slioi-ter iil tlie US thaii i11 tlle foui- Europeail couiltries. 
The tliird seasotlal effect tliat we coilsider inore tlioro~tgllly  is the 
\%ars-eiiding-in-five  cff'ect.  Smith (1924) docuiileiited  iil tiie  early 
1920s tliat years ending in five have by far the best returns on aver- 
age."  Tlie literahlre lias been reii~arl<ably  sileiit about this plieiiomeiloii. 
Table  1 shows that for tlie five couiitries tlie average rehli-ils 111 years 
eilding i11 five is sribstantially greatei- tliail tlie average return over the 
entire period. Figure 3 displays tlie average ~lio~itlily  retui-11s iii years 
ending iii IIve and in years eiidiiig iii other iluiiibers. Again, for al1 
couiitries (except for tlie UK) the differences betweeil tlie two periods 
are cubstaiitial. For Gennaiiy, for exainple, tlie average rehli~is  are more 
thaii two percent liiglier in years eiiding in five thaii years eiidiiig i11 
other numnbers. To test if yeai-s endilig in five llave a sigiiificaiit higher 
average retuin thaii otlier years, we use tlie followiiig equation: 
where U5,  is ai1 indicator for a year eiidiiig iii five: it taltes tlie valiie 
1 foi tl-ie observations in ttie year.; ciicling in he,  anid  O for tlie othzl 
FIGURE 3 
ili.ei.rrge i.rflii.17~  i17  ~.L'(I~:S  eiii/iiig ii7,fivr ciiiii ofliei.  j'eiii:~ 
Years Ending n  5 oiiscr.vaíioris. Panel C of Tabie 2 siiows tiiat tlie 17ears-eiiditig-111-he 
effect is oiily statistically sigilificant for Gerinasiy and the US. Wliile 
Figure 3 suggests that the deceniiial cycle is also preseiit  in Belgian, 
Dutcli aiid UK reiui~ls,  it is iiot statistically significant. 
The next step is to look at tlie receiit period Jaii~iaiy  1990 - May 
2002. The reason for this is twofold. First, if the apparent aiioiiialy is 
a result of data siioopiiig, it sliould disappear in later data. The secoiid 
reason to look at recent data is tliat theoretically, iii inarlcets witho~it 
frictioiis, ai1 aiioiiialy sliould disappear as traders atteiiipt to take advaii- 
tage of it i11 advaiice. Figures 4 tliro~~gli  6 display tl~e  average iiioiitlily 
i-eixi-ns iii tlie ailoiiialy period and the averages i11 otlier inoiiths for the 
period Januaiy 1990 -  May 2002. Figure 4 suggests that tlie Jaiiuary 
effect largely disappeared over tlie last decade. Iii tlie Netherlaiids aiid 
UK, f'or  example, tlie Januaiy effect even seeiiied to have reversed 
itself, while tlie January effect remains substalitial iri Gei-iilany. If the 
Januaiy effect would be a profitable aiioii~aly  to base a strategy oii, it 
sliould be tliere for al1 couiltries arid for al1 (recent) periods. To check 
the statistica1 significaiice of tliis anoinaly, we lui1 regressi011 (1) over 
tl~e  period Jaii~ialy  1990 -  May 2002. Panel A of Table 3 shows that 
tlie coefficient of the Jaii~laiy  di~imny  is iiot sigiiificaiitly diffei-eiit  from 
zero aiiyniore for any couiitiy. Tlius, tlie January effect seemed to have 
disappeared iii value weiglited stoclc iiiarltet indices. Sonie16  believe tlie 
Januaiy effect has inoved iiito November and Deceinber as a resiilt of 
FIGURE  4 
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SEE3SOA7,4L EFFECTS. THE PEIUOD 1990-2002 
Re.szilts of'estii~intii7g  eqitotioi7s (1)-(3),fbr  the pei.iotl 1990:l -  3007:5, itsiilg 
the i-efiii.ris 011  tlw ~'nliie  iveighted stock int1ice.s  fbi. Be1giii111.  Gern~ni-; 
tl7e Netl7ri.loi7ds. UK  oild  US. Tì7e t-i;nlries hnsed 011 17etei.o.~ceiJ~i,s1ici1~~ 
coiisi.c.triif  .stni7d~ird  ei./-oilc.  a1.e  i-e11oi.ted i17  j~ni.ei7ti~ese.c.;  " iizdicrrtes rhat the 
coi.ies~~oniliilg  cocj;iicient is  statistically d~ffei.ei~r  ji.oi17  zei.0  at tl?e,fìve  pei.cei7t 
rigi?ifÌc.ni?c,e  1i.1,i.l 
Explaiiatory 
Belgiziin  Geriilaiiy  ;Vetherlnnds  UI< 
Variables 
Pancl A: Jaiiuary Effcct 
Coilstailt  0.005  0.005  0.011*  0.006  0.008" 
(1.267)  (1.067)  (2.577)  (1.748)  (2.247) 
Jaii,~.  ,  0.003  0.014  -0.009  -0.005  0.002 
(0.193)  (1.167)  (-0.707)  (-0.413)  (0.  167) 
RZ  0.000  0.005  0.003  0.001  0.000 
Adj.  R'  -0.006  -0.002  -0.004  -0.006  -0.007 
Panel B: December Effect 
Constant  -0.003  -0.006  0.000  0.002  0.004 
-0.525  -0.861  0.004  0.293  0.807 
S,+~i  0.015"  0.025"  0.0194'  0.008  0.009 
2.053  2.747  2.506  1.252  1.246 
R2  0.028  0.049  0.041  0.011  O110 
Adj. R'  0.021  0.043  0.035  0.004  0.004 
Pariel D: Years-Eiidii~g-in-Fivc  Effcct 
Coiistant  0.005  0.007  0.009"  0.005  0.007 
1.151  1.320  2.283  1.364  1.860 
y5,11  0.006  0.000  0.003  0.011  0.018'" 
0.574  -0.013  0.371  1.577  3.254 
R'  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.014 
Ac//  R2  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006  -0.002  0.007 ln~rluai  furids beiiig recluired to repoi-r lioláiiigs ar the end of October 
aild from investors buyiilg in anticipation of gaiiis in Januaiy. To exa-  .  - 
mine this question, we i-un a regression witli a Deceinber durnmy 
instead of the Jaiiuary dummy. Panel B  of Table 3 sliows that  for 
Belgiuin, the Netherlands  and UK, we fiild a significailt Deceiilber 
effect for the period 1990:l-2002:5.  T11is  s~ippoi-ts  the hypotliesis that 
the Jailuaiy  effect has inoved into Deceinber. We  also rail a siillilar 
regression with a Noveiilber duniniy. Contrary to Bhabra, Dhilloii and 
Rainirez (1996), our results (not reported) stroilgly reject tlie presence 
of a Noveiilber effect iil each country." 
Lookiilg at Figure 5, we see that the Sell-iil-May effect seem to 
remain in the recent  saiilple for each couiltry, suggesting that this 
aiioinaly has not disappeared over time. The "Sell-in-May results", 
presented iil Panel C of Table 3, show that the anomaly is still statis- 
tically  significant  for  Belgiuiil,  Germany  and  the  Netherlailds. 
This Halloweeii strategy also yields excess returns for the UK aild 
US, but these are ilot statistically significant anymore. Note however 
that the power of the significante test is reduced as we have fewer 
obsei-vations iii the recent sample. To test the possibility that the Sell- 
iil-May effect is simply the January effect in disguise, we consider 
a regression i11  which we additioilally iiiclude  a  Jan~iary  duminy. 
FIGURE 5 
Avertrge rntz17.n~  in Mq-Octoher ("Surni)ier'> 
czi~d  A'oveir~l~~?i~-Api.ij  ("Wi~ilei."j,  1990-2002 
NET TEiis resuitecl in cluaiitiiaiively ideiiticai resui~s:  a siatisticaliy signiíï- 
cant Sell-in-May effect for Belgium, Germany and tlie Netherlandc. 
Fiiially, Figure 6 suggests that the Years-eiiding-in-five effect largely 
disappeared over the last decade. Oiily for tlie UK aild US thei-e seems 
to remaiii a decennia1 cycle. Panel D of Table 3 provides statistica1 evi- 
detlce tliat the Years-eiidii~g-iil-five  effect is only significant for tlie US 
over tlie period  1990:  1 -  2002:5.  It is important to realize Ihat tlie t- 
tests are ilot f~~lly  reliable, giveii the iiuinber of observations in this 
sainple. Because the Years-eiiding-iii-five  effect is a long-teim cycle, 
we ileed inany years of data to draw statistically reliable coiiclusioiis 
conceriiiiig the deceimiuiii effect.'Wespite this liinitatioil we caii coii- 
clude that overall we find only very little support of this possible 
deceimial cycle outside the US. Conseq~~ently,  it is wel1 possible that 
this seasoiial effect is just  a randoin eveiit. 
Whereas the January effect and Years-endiiig-in-five effect seein to 
have disappeared over tiine, the Sell-in-May effect is still present. 
Moreover, it is iiot uiilikely that this effect wil1 continue to exist. Data 
snooping seeins an uiililtely explanation for the Sell-in-May ano~iialy. 
Unlilte the January effect and Years-ending-in-five effect, the Sell-in- 
May strategy is not selected from a large universe of caleildar rules, 
as the strategy is based o11  aii old inarltet wisdoin. While these are 
some possible explanations for tlie Jaiiuary effect, we do ilot find any 
outperforinance iii Jaiiuary anyinoi-e using the recent data. If there 
really is a Januaiy effect, it should have sliowed up in tlie recent data 
FIGURE 6 
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ars Ending in 5 
r Years as well. Iiistead it disappeared. Tlie effect seeins to have shifted to 
Deceinber. As the Years-ending-in-five effect is found by trying iliaily 
possible caleildar ailolnalies,  it is  almost surely to disappear in the 
fi~ture.  While the difference in rehmls for the period 1973 -  2002 look 
iinpressive,  only for Geimaily aild the  US tl~ei-e  is a statistica1 out- 
perforinance for years eildiilg in five. Moreover, tlie outperfoilnailce 
of 1995 -  the most recent year ending in five -  is less spectacular and 
only statistically sigiiificant for the US. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Receiit literahlre seenls to suggest that stock rehirns are predictable to 
some degree. Seasoiialities in stock inarket retunls, for example, are 
docuinented extensively. In tlie empirica1 application of this paper we 
iilvestigated the statistica1  significailce of predicting stock retunls from 
several calendar dumniies. Tlie data includes the monthly indices froin 
Belgiuin, Geimaily, the Netherlands, UK ai~d  US. Our inaiil findings 
indicate that the Sell-in-May effect is clearly present in each country. 
The ret~irils  iii winter inontl~s  (from November until April) are inuch 
larger than those in sumner months (froin May until October) months. 
The finding of a relatively strong effect for European couiltries seems 
to be consistent with the relatively long suminer holiday in European 
countries. The Sell-in-May effect is still present in recent data and it 
is not uillil<ely  that tl~is  effect wil1 continue to exist. 
January has historically  been  the  best  inoilth  to  be invested in 
stocl<s.  However, oilly for Belgiuin and the Netherlands we fiild a sig- 
nificant  January effect between  Januaiy  1973 and May 2002. Over 
the recent period, January 1990 -  May 2002, the ailonlaly is ilot pre- 
sent anymore aild for soine couiltries the January effect seeined to 
have reversed  itself.  Tliis  suggests that  the  anomaly disappeared 
because traders took advantage of it in advailce. Tliere now seeins to 
be a Deceinber effect, which is possibly an ailticipatioil effect. 
Another remarkable, but iiot so wel1 known seasonal pattern is the 
Years-ending-in-five  effect. The US stock inarltet has never llad a 
down year in aily year ending in five. Our results suggest tl~at  these 
oilly is a statistically significant effect for Gennany and tlie US. As the 
Years-eiiding-in-five effect is selected froin a wide universe of calen- 
dar i-ules aild is mainly present in the US, it is liltely that this decen- 
ilial cycle is pi~rely  a raiidoii1 event. 1. Olie of the earliest eiiipirical st~idy  iiicludcs Cowles (1933). 
7. Note tliat me only focus on tlie time-series  predictability  of retiirns. For aii ovcrvic\v 
of cross-sectional retuin predictability see, e.g.. Hawaiiini and Keim (1995). 
3. Iiidividual stoclt returns. on tlie otlier liaiid. terid to be iiegatively autocorrelatcd ori a 
daily and weekly frequency.  possibly due to overreaction effects and market niicro- 
structurc effects (sec Cainpbell; Lo ai~i  MacKinlay (19971, Chapter 2, and Jacobsen 
(1999)). Wliile tlie rclation  is statistically significant in inany cases, iiiost of tlie pre- 
dictability ~ising  past rctiiriis ciis~ippciiis  \\licii (iiiSuriiiaii«ii anci) traiisactiuii cusk aic 
takc~i  into account, cspccially thc prcdictability ioiind o11 high-frcqucncy basis. Tlie fact 
iliat iiidividual sccnritics arc weakly negativcly autocorrclated. wliile portfolio rctui-11s. 
which are essentially averages of individual  security returns, are strongly positively 
autocorrelated lool<s somewhat paradoxical at first sight. but this effect is d~ie  to large 
positive cross-a~itocoi-relations  across individual securities across time (see Caiiipbell. 
Lo aiid MacKiiilay (1997), Chapter 2). 
4. Moreover Solnik (1993) uses a Jaiiuary dummy to account for the possible Jaiiuaiy 
effect as described above. 
5. "Tlie  January cffcct is perliaps tlie best-l<iiown exainple of a~ioinalous  beliavior  in 
sccurity inarkets tlirouglio~it  tlie world", Haugcii and Jorion (1996). 
6. Bliabra, Dliillo~i  and Raiiiircr (1996) dociiment tlic cxistencc ofa  Novcinbcr effect i11 
US stoclt returns. 
7.  In a related paper, Wang, Li and Erickson (1997) show tliat the day-of-tlie-weel< effect 
occurs primarily in the last two weelts of the inonth. Tliey find that this phenoiiieiiori 
cannot fiilly be explained by the turn-of-the-month effect. 
8. For example, Krueger and Keniiedy (1990) show tliat if tlie winning team of tlie 
Ainerican Super Bowl (whicli is held in Jariuary) is a team froin the Natioiial Football 
League (ratlier thaii froin the alternative American Football League), tlie US stock 
market wil1 most probably rise that year. Tliis indicator predicts the stock market direc- 
tion more than 90% of tlie years correctly between 1967 and 1988! 
9. Because most international stock marltets rehlnis are highly correlated witli tlie U.S. 
stock market rehlnis, it is still likely tliat  these datasets  still suffer from the data 
silooping problems. 
10. This meaiis that al1 dividends are re-iiiuested in tlie indices. 
11.  Including a lagged retu1-n on tlie inarltet portfolio to coi-rect for possible autocorrela- 
tion in retums does not yield to qualitatively different results for al1 regressions. 
Monthly returns exhibit iio signiiïcaiit autocorrelation. 
12. For sirnplicity, we denote in al1 inodels the  eiTor term  as  E,  in this paper, althougli 
they do iiot represent tlie saine. 
13.  We obtaiii veiy similar results wlien tlie indicator is equal to 1 in October as well. 
14.  Although we (statistically)  reject the random walk model and find predictability  i11 
returns; olie should be careful in iriteiyreting these results. Rejecting tlie raildom wal]< 
model, does not necessarily iinply tliat we caii profit frorn this predictability in prac- 
tice. Ratlier than loolting only at thc statistical significante we sliould also exaininc 
the econoinic sigiiificance of ihe predictability. In other words, cari we exploit this prc- 
dictability out-of-sample arid after correctiiig for risk consideratioiis and traiisactioii 
costs? Marquering and Verbeek  (2001) show liow to measure the econoinic signilï- 
cance, by examiiiing predictability using financial aiid niacroecoiiomic variables. Tliey 
find tliat strategies based on tliis predictability  is economically significant. bilt deteri- 
orates after 1990. 
15.  Whereas Sinitli (1924) found that years endiiig iii seveii have the worst ret~iins,  we do 
not find aiiy significant abnonnal return  for years ending in seveii for al1 countries. 
The results can be obtained frorn tlie autlior upon request. 16.  See. e.g., Bhabra. Dl~ilioii  and Raiiiirez (1996). 
17. Tlie results caii bc obtained froiii the autlior upon reqiiest. 
18. Altcinatively, we could test wlletl~ci-  tlie statistical cvidcnce of a decenriiuin effect in 
tlie US is due to  1995. This hypoliiesis  is tested iising samplesl965:l-1990:12 ailcl 
1954:  1 - 1990:  12. The rcsults  (iiot reportcd)  show that the Ycni-s-eiidiiig-in-fivc effect 
iii tlie US is iiot due to  1995. 
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